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THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF DRIVING
COMPETENCE REGULATIONS
MARGARET

F.

BRINIG*

This article begins with an explanation of the problem facing legislatures in deciding how to structure the rules for renewal
of driver's licenses. After that, it explores the strengths and
weaknesses of the various state legislative and regulatory
schemes, which are classified according to their predominant
means of regulation. Some effort is made to identify the optimal
scheme, both to permit the largest number of capable drivers to
remain on the road and to ensure that elderly drivers are
unlikely to cause accidents. Finally, the article discusses the reasons why particular legislation might be adopted, based on public choice and behavioral economics explanations.
State lawmakers constantly balance and optimize. They do
so to protect their own interests as well as to advance the needs of
their constituents. Like all decision makers, they must budget
the time they spend on various issues and choose which stances
to promote, which to actively oppose, and which to merely support or reject through voting.
Legal and economic academics have, understandably,
focused primarily on the political or financial reasons for sponsoring or rejecting legislation.' They have not spent as much
effort discussing the function of time, something that frequently
recurs in our federal system in areas reserved to state sovereignty.
*

Sorin Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am greatly indebted

to my former colleagues at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics: Gerald
Jogerst, M.D., Dept. of Family Medicine;Jeanette Daly, R.N. and Ph.D., Dept. of
Family Medicine; Mark Wilkinson, O.D., Dept. of Ophthalmology; and Edwin
Stone, M.D., Dept. of Ophthalmology. I have also been helped with terrific
research assistance in collecting and coding statutes and legislative histories
from Elizabeth Ahrold, Regina Ori, Jordan Esbrook, and Brian Raimondo. I
have also received very helpful suggestions from Nicole Garnett, Francesco Parisi, Richard McAdams, Michael Meurer, Keith Hylton, Amitai Aviron, and
Stephanos Bibas. I thank participants at the Canadian and Midwestern Economics Associations and faculty colloquiums at Brooklyn, Seton Hall, and Boston University Law Schools.
1. See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv.
339 (1988) (using public choice theory to discuss the comparative costs of introducing and passing a bill).
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This article considers a particular form of balancing in the
context of state driving legislation and regulation. States have
quite a variety of laws and regulations dealing with individuals'
continuing capacity to drive. They may differ along a variety of
axes: frequency of license renewal, visual or competency standards, testing requirements at renewal, and flexibility in relaxing
these standards.2 Not surprisingly, states vary tremendously in
the safety of their roads, particularly for the older drivers (and
those coming into their paths). In choosing how to deal with
tightening or loosening driving standards, states are balancing
drivers' independence against society's general safety.
This article presents an analysis of the varying state licensing
schemes, in terms of their substantive differences and their
resulting outcomes for approaching optimal levels of driving. It
is therefore part of the literature on the market for legislation
However, it goes one step further than the
among the states.
"race to the top"3 or "race to the bottom"4 papers: it analyzes why
some states have pioneered in drafting driving laws designed to
optimize the number of older drivers and why some have followed the call of the AARP and other pressure groups to allow a
market-based solution.
If the matter of designing optimal driving laws could be seen
in terms of attracting or deterring types of potential state
residents, then presumably, at least on the margin, the states with
growing numbers of elderly citizens would have the best-or at
least the most tolerant-driving laws. Table 1 presents two sets
of data: states with the largest absolute growth in the population
over sixty-five and those with the highest percentage of elderly.5
I.

STANDARDS FOR LICENSING AND DRIVING

Driving is important to adults' sense of well-being. When
drivers lose their driving privileges, they may suffer from a variety
of ills. The effects of loss of driving privileges have been noted
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION (2002) (contemplating the competitive market
forces subjected on United States securities laws); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max
Schanzenbach, JurisdictionalCompetition for Trust Funds: An EmpiricalAnalysis of
Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom andFederalEnvironmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 535 (1997).
5. All tables are compiled at the end of this article.
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not only for Americans, 6 but also for drivers in Germany 7 and
Britain.8
Driving is also typically needed to continue independence
and connection with others. Once independence is lost, the
older person, especially in rural or suburban America,9 may be
unable to live alone and may have to move into assisted living
environments, rely on the ministrations of children, relatives, or
friends, or even relocate to another area. Maintaining one's
independence itself is strongly connected with both physical and
mental well-being. For an increasingly aging population, therefore, especially those living outside urban areas that have easy
access to public transportation, continuing to drive has enormous and growing significance.
Older persons frequently self-monitor and restrict their driving because they realize they cannot see as well as before or have
slower reaction times.1 0 In addition to a decrease in the number
of miles they drive, they may make other changes in their driving
habits, such as driving only during the daytime, driving the side
streets instead of main streets, driving more slowly, or only driving on Sundays."1 Still, the number of elderly citizens is increasing, which escalates the number of older drivers and also, so far,
their accident rates. 12 Both for their own physical and mental
health and for the safety of others on the road, society has an
interest in keeping unsafe drivers from driving.
The driving privileges of the elderly are and will continue to
be an issue of public debate, especially after a high profile case
such as the accident of an eighty-year-old driver in California who
David R. Ragland, William A. Satariano & Kara E. MacLeod, Driving

6.

Cessation and Increased Depressive Symptoms, 60 J. GERONTOLOGY:. MED. Sci. 399

(2005).
Bernhard Schlag, Elderly Drivers in Germany-Fitness and Driving Behav47 (1993).
U.K. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, OLDER DRIVERS: A LITERATuRE
REVIEW (No. 25) (2001), http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/roadsafety/research/
rsrr/theme3/olderdriversaliteraturerevie4770?version=1.
9. See, e.g., Op-Ed, Reassessing Our Roads for Iowa's Elderly, IOWA CITY PRESSCITIZEN, Sept. 2, 2003, at 13A;Jonathan Roos &John McCormick, Lure of Wheels
Endures, DES MOINES REG.,July 8, 2001, at lB ("It's a way to maintain some level
7.
ior, 25
8.

ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION

of independence because alternative transportation is very limited, especially in
rural Iowa," said Mary Ann Young of the Iowa Department of Elder Affairs. "We
want to keep them as mobile as possible-safely.").
10. See Leonard Evans, How Safe Were Today's Older Drivers hen They Were

Younger?, 137 Am.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 769 (1993).
11. See Wayne J. Millar, Older Drivers-A Complex Public Health Issue, 11
HEALTH REPORTS 59, 65 (1999).
12.

SeeJay S. Buechner, Motor Vehicle Crashes Among the Elderly, 1994-1998,

82 MED. &

HEALTH

449 (1999).
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killed nine people at a farmer's market.1 3 As the older population increases, a quarter of all fatal crashes are expected to come
from the twenty-eight million drivers age sixty-five years and
older.1 4 "Achieving a balance between public safety and older
adults' own safety and independence" mandates "safety initiatives
directed specifically at older adults."1 5 "Imposing blanket restrictions on older drivers would not serve the goal of maximizing the
independence of older adults while ensuring public safety and
their own.""

Similar to the problems associated with loss of vision, the
cessation of driving is an important and difficult task in caring
for persons with dementia. One study reported that the rate of
crashes per year increased after the first year of diagnosis for all
licensed Alzheimer's dementia drivers (0.068 in year one to
0.159 by year four).1 7 Some dementia patients have insight into
their driving deficits, but individuals with frontal temporal
dementia in particular lack insight and therefore may not voluntarily give up driving.18 Although a number of driving safety tests
have been suggested,1 9 no guidelines have been broadly applied.
13. See Robert Jablon, Elderly Man Convicted of Manslaughter in Farmer's
Market Crash, SFGate.com, Oct. 20, 2006, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?
f=/n/a/2006/10/20/state/n112352D88.DTL (stating that the driver was found
guilty of ten counts of vehicular manslaughter on October 20, 2006 and faced a
maximum of eighteen years in prison). E.g., Abraham McLaughlin & Amanda
Paulson, Age and Driving: A Closer Look, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, July 8, 2003, at
1; see also Deborah McGregor, Driving Over 65: Proceed with Caution, 28J. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 22 (2002).
14. Center for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics,
Alzheimer's Disease, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/alzheimr.htm (indicating
the increasing number of persons aged sixty-five and older suffering from
Alzheimer's disease and linking viewers to other websites tracking the rise in
deaths of senior citizens attributable to Alzheimer's).
15. Michel Bdard et al., Traffic-Related FatalitiesAmong Older Drivers and
Passengers: Past and Future Trends, 41 THE GERONTOLOGIST 751, 754 (2001).
16. Id.
17. David A. Drachman &Joan M. Swearer, Driving and Alzheimer's Disease:
The Risk of Crashes, 43 NEUROLOGY 2448, 2451 (1993) (comparing the risk of
auto crashes among Alzheimer's dementia disease patients, who continued to
drive after the onset of the disease, to the crash records of age-matched control
subjects, who were not suffering from Alzheimer's, and thus concluding that
evidence suggests Alzheimer's patients who drive present a slightly increased
risk for crashes).
18. See, e.g.,
Susan Levine, Driving Issue: Keeping Seniors Safe and Mobile,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Maine), Mar. 15, 1998, at 1C.
19. See, e.g.,
L. Jaime Fitten et al., Alzheimer and Vascular Dementias and
Driving: A Prospective Road and Laboratory Study, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1360,
1364-65 (1995); Linda A. Hunt et al., Reliability of the Washington University Road
Test: A Performance-BasedAssessment for Drivers with Dementia of the Alzheimer Type,
54 ARcHrVs OF NEUROLOGY 707 (1997).
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The American Academy of Neurology has issued driving guidelines for patients with Alzheimer's disease based on the Clinical
Dementia Rating (CDR) scale, according to which patients and
families should be told that a CDR of 1 or greater is associated
with a marked increase in accident rate and driving performance
errors.20 Patients with this rating should not drive automobiles."
The CDR scale classification of 1 means that there is moderate memory loss and that this deficit interferes with everyday
activities. 2" Further, it means there is moderate difficulty with
time relationships and that the patient may have geographic disorientation. Judgment and problem solving are impaired,
although social judgment usually is maintained. Although they
have mild but definite impairment of function at home and may
need prompting about personal care, individuals with a CDR of 1
do manifest an ability to function independently at community
activities. Poor cognitive performance is sometimes not recognized by physicians, and thus, recommendations to quit driving
are not given.23
For reasons discussed previously, older persons are at a
higher risk for fatal accidents, but unsafe driving does not tell the
whole story. As they age, people also become frailer, so a higher
percentage of accidents in which injuries occur will result in
deaths of older persons.2 4 Some accidents that will not cause any
injury to a youthful driver may prove fatal to an elderly driver.
Thus, unlike most studies, 5 this study uses 2003 data, available
from the United States Department of Transportation concerning a sample of all accidents reported to state agencies and
includes drivers' ages and zip codes. These were matched to
states so that they could be associated with laws and demographic
data.
20.

Richard M. Dubinsky, Anthony C. Stein & Kelly Lyons, PracticeParame-

ter: Risk of Driving and Alzheimer's Disease (an Evidence-Based Review): Report of the
Quality StandardsSubcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology, 54 NEUROLOGY
2205, 2210 (2000).
21. Id.
22. John C. Morris, The ClinicalDementia Rating (CDR): Current Version and
Scoring Rules, 43 NEUROLOGY 2412, 2413 (1993).
23. Victor G. Valcour, Kamal H. Masaki & Patricia L. Blanchette, SelfReported Driving, Cognitive Status, and Physician Awareness of Cognitive Impairment,
50 J. Am. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 1265 (2002).
24. E.g., Daniel J. Foley et al., Driving Life Expectancy of Persons Aged 70
Years and Older in the United States, 92 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1284, 1284 (2002).
25. See, e.g., Robin A. Barr, Recent Changes in DrivingAmong OlderAdults, 33
HUM. FACTORS 597 (1991); Bdard et al., supranote 15, at 751; NATIONAL HIGHWAY

TRAFIC

SAFETY ADMIN.,

U.

S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANsPORATION, TRAFFIC

SAFETY FACTS 2000 (2001), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/TSF2000.PDF
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T TRANsP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 20001.
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The purpose of this study is to describe and classify each
state's driver's licensing laws, determine the percentage of persons over sixty-four with licenses and the percentage of those
licensed who have accidents, investigate whether there is a relationship between the licensing schemes and these two percentages, and recommend a uniform driving standard.
A. Driving Regulations
The regulation of drivers generally takes place on the state
level. Most states specify detailed qualifications for original and
renewal licensing in regulations promulgated by the state's
department of motor vehicles, with or without the help of a Medical Control Board. 26 Each state's statutes and regulations are
typically compiled in a driver's license manual. States prescribe
different licensing standards for renewal and physician-reporting
procedures.
Some of these variations include the renewal interval, vision
requirements (typically 20/40), options for discretionary or
restricted licensing, and type of road testing. Some, but not all,
states require that drivers be able to see over some field of vision;
the most frequent requirement is 140 degrees with both eyes.2 7
Even the restrictions vary. West Virginia and Vermont, for example, do not prescribe any restrictions beyond those for corrective
lenses. 28

Most states allow restrictions, but these differ widely

and can include daylight-only driving, no highway driving, driv26. For a useful summary of these, see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR
VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS, SUMMARY OF MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD PRACTICES IN
THE UNITED STATES (2003), available at http://www.aamva.org (follow "search"
hyperlink; then type "Summary of Medical Advisory Board Practices in the
United States").
27. See, e.g., ARJZ. ADMIN. CODE § 17-4-503(B) (2) (2006) (Field of vision
must be 700 temporally, plus 350 nasally, in at least one eye.); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 27-16-704(b) (4) (West 2006) (Field of vision must be 1400 for a person with
two functional eyes and at least 1050 for a person with one functional eye.).
28. See generally DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, WEST VIRGINIA. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DRIVER LICENSING MANUAL 23 (2006), available at
http://www.wvdot.com/6_motorists/dmv/downloads/drivershandbook.pdf:
If your vision is less than 20/40 or you have a serious visual defect, you
will not pass the test and will be advised to consult a vision specialist to
determine if your vision can be brought to the 20/40 level. If it cannot, you must provide a statement.., from a vision specialist which
includes a description of your visual condition and a recommendation
as to whether you can drive with reasonable safety and what restrictions, if any, should be placed on your driving.
See also Vermont department of Motor Vehicles, Vermont 2004-2005 Driver's
Manual (2005), available at http://www.aot.state.vt.us/dmv/documents/Manuals/DriverLicense/2004DriverManual.pdf:
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ing for business or employment only, driving only with power
steering, or driving using special controls or equipment. For
example, Wyoming has specific restrictions that include daytimeonly driving and weather and distance restrictions,2 9 while
Nebraska has a table specifying various restrictions given varying
vision problems."0 Restricted licensing, however, does not solve
all the problems.3 ' One study found that drivers with restricted
licenses have a higher crash rate than those without
restrictions.3 2
Although according to federal law, commercial driver's
license holders must report arrests for moving violations to the
state, 33 there is no such standard requirement that non-commercial drivers self-report either arrests or an inability to drive safely
between renewals. Still, some states require that physicians
report drivers who do not meet vision requirements, and a few
have mandatory reporting of such conditions as Alzheimer's disease and other illnesses that cause dementia or loss of consciousness. 34 Other states simply suggest that such problems be

If the results of the screening determine that your vision does not
meet the required standards of 20/40, you will be referred to an eye
doctor of your choice for further testing. The eye doctor will complete an evaluation to determine . . . if any restrictions should be

placed on your driving privilege.
29. TransAnalytics, LLC, Summary of Medical Advisory Board Practices in
the United States 359 (2003) [hereinafter Medical Advisory Board Practices]
(on file with author), available at http://www.biopticdriving.org/repository/
main/drvsummaryofmedicaladvisoryboardpractices.pdf (This is an unpublished study carried out on behalf of the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.); see
also Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-7-117 (2006):
Upon issuing a driver's license the division for good cause may impose
restrictions suitable to the licensee's driving ability. The restrictions
may require special mechanical control devices on any motor vehicle
which the licensee may drive and any other restrictions upon the licensee the division determines to be necessary and reasonably likely to

assure the safe driving of any motor vehicle by the licensee.
30. Medical Advisory Board Practices, supra note 29, at 199; see also 247
NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 7-002 (2007), available at http://www.sos.state.ne.us/business/regsearch/Rules/Motor VehiclesDept.of/Title-247/Chapter-7.pdf.
31. Cf Shawn C. Marshall et al., Restricted Driver Licensing for Medical
Impairments: Does It Work?, 167 CAN. MED. AsS'NJ. 747 (2002).

32.
33.

Id. at 749.
49 C.F.R. § 391.27 (2005).

34.

See, e.g., Medical Advisory Board Practices, supra note 29, at 257

(reporting on Oregon); see also infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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reported, and many provide immunity from civil or criminal liability for such reporting.3 5
Some states change the renewal procedures for older persons by shortening the period between renewals, by mandating
in-person as opposed to mail-in registration, or by requiring
vision, written, or road testing. 6 One might expect these
increased screens to produce fewer problem drivers. In fact,
David T. Levy and colleagues examined the relationship between
driver's license renewal policies and fatal crashes and found that
state-mandated tests of visual acuity, adjusted for license renewal
period, were associated with a lower fatal crash risk for senior
drivers. 7
This piece expands on these authors' earlier works by
including all licensing requirements and a different outcome
variable for reported traffic accidents."8 The previous studies
were based on drivers aged seventy years and older because many
state renewal policies applicable to older drivers were triggered
at age seventy. More recently, many states have changed their
renewal provisions. 39 Twenty states have no specific age-based
35. See, e.g., Medical Advisory Board Practices, supra note 29, at 15 ("[Arizona] statutes indicate that physicians and psychologists who report drivers in
good faith are immune from civil or criminal liability.").
36. See infra Parts I.B.1, 4-5.
37. David T. Levy, The Relationship of Age and State License Renewal Policies to
Driving Licensure Rates, 27 ACCIDENT ANALYsIs & PREVENTION 461 (1995).
38. The GES sample downloaded from the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration website "collects a nationally representative sample of
ALL police reported motor vehicle traffic accidents." See Dennis Flemons,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, National Center for Statistics &
Analysis, FARS & GES 2005 Changes to Data Collection 8 (transcript available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/PPT/2005/FARS-GES.pdf
(last visited Sept. 5, 2006)). It includes an annual sample of approximately fiftyseven thousand police traffic accident reports that meet the state reporting criteria, that are signed by a police officer, and that cover all types of motor vehicles. Id.
39. According to the Highway Loss Data Institute, Maryland requires a
vision test at every renewal after age forty and Oregon requires one after age
fifty. North Carolina begins an accelerated renewal cycle at age fifty-four.
Georgia changes renewal procedures at age sixty and adds vision tests at age
sixty-four. Colorado begins accelerated renewal cycles at age sixty-one, and
Idaho at sixty-three (with increases in frequency for drivers eighty-one and
over). States which change renewal procedures for drivers aged sixty-five and
above include Arizona, Kansas, Maine, South Carolina, and Utah. Alaska does
not allow renewal by mail for licencees sixty-nine or older but does not otherwise accelerate renewal. California, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Rhode Island
and the District of Columbia change renewal procedures at age seventy. Hawaii
starts accelerated renewal procedures for drivers aged seventy-two and above.
Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, and New Mexico start at seventy-five. Florida and Virginia require a vision test for renewal applicants aged eighty or
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renewal procedures.4 0 With a standard renewal requirement of
four to six years for most states, the driver of age sixty-five to seventy will have to renew at some point. Frequent renewal may
have an impact on fatalities and crashes.4 1
Given all these differences, it is perhaps unsurprising that
the results on rates of driving and accidents by those over sixtyfour vary widely as well. States' percentages of the driving population that is over sixty-four vary from a low of 7% (Alaska) to a
high of 19.6% (Florida), while the overall average is 14.9%.42
What is more revealing is the ratio of the number of older persons driving compared to their number in the population, taking
out demographics but including the influence not only of laws
but also of the urban-rural mix. The District of Columbia and
Rhode Island had the lowest number of older drivers, while
Alaska, Vermont, and Connecticut had the highest, all with about
50% of the older population driving and an average of 40%
among all jurisdictions.43
In addition to great variation in the numbers of older persons who drive, the proportion of those over sixty-five who are
involved in accidents varies by location, with a low of less than
1% in five jurisdictions (District of Columbia, Hawaii, North
Dakota, Utah, and Vermont, all of which reported very few accidents), 5% in Maryland, 6% or less in California, Texas, Ohio,
and Virginia, and 15% in Arkansas and nearly 29% of all
reported accidents in Idaho. 44 These numbers do not account
for the percentage of older persons who drive. Taking the number of accidents with drivers over sixty-five, as above, and dividing
it by the number of drivers over age sixty-five also produces substantial variance, from a low of zero reported accidents by older
persons in Hawaii, District of Columbia, North Dakota, and Vermont (and only one reported accident in Utah and around
0.02% of accidents in California), to more than 0.1% of reported
older, and Illinois changes its renewal procedures at eighty-one. See Highway
Loss Data Institute, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, U.S. Driver Licensing Procedures for Older Drivers (2006), http://www.iihs.org/laws/state-laws/

older-drivers.html [hereinafter Highway Loss Data].
40. States which have no specific age-based and safety-related renewal
procedures include: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,

Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id.
41. For a chart summarizing these rules (with no citations), see Highway
Loss Data, supra note 39.
42. See infra Tbl. 2
43. See infra Tbl. 2.
44. Table on file with author.
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accidents in Colorado, New Mexico, Michigan, Alabama, and Arizona, with a rate of nearly .19% or two per thousand drivers age
sixty-five and older in 2003. 4
B.

Regulatory Options for Improving Driving of Older Persons

In deciding upon licensing and driving standards, states
could, and do, select among a variety of regulatory options. The
lawmakers are presumably balancing access to driving privileges,
convenience and cost of licensing, and continued driving safety.
The following analysis lists some of these methods, the states that
choose to use them, and the rate of accidents produced. Note
that in some cases states will employ more than one method.
These cases are noted in the discussion below, though the prevalent method is used in the empirical analysis. Figure 1 captures
the trade-off between safety and driving privileges of the elderly.
1.

Restricted

States might restrict all driving by senior citizens, since they
are more accident-prone and certainly more fatality-prone.4 6
This choice, of course, may have consequences under anti-discrimination laws,47 and some states have been sued by older persons on these grounds.4 8 The easiest and most cost-effective way
to limit driving in a non-discriminatory fashion is to restrict
through 20/40 acuity, 140-degree field of vision licensing. This is
apparently the rule in Hawaii, New York, and South Carolina.4 9
However, this method is not less expensive than others since, as
noted above, 5" the inability to drive may lead to more depression,
more isolation, and perhaps even more elder abuse, as older persons must live with relatives or in nursing homes for longer periods. The gain is that the older persons are not causing accidents
at a cost of additional burdens on families and facilities.
45. See infra Tbls. 2, 5, 6.
46. States which follow this approach are deemed "Restricted" in Table 3.
47. See, e.g., 90 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 8 (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting the registrar from discriminating based on age when the registrar administers the examination of the qualifications of the particular driver's license
applicant).
48. E.g., Berger v. Melton, 418 N.Y.S.2d 880 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
49. See infraTbl. 3 (characterizing Hawaii, New York, and South Carolina
as "Restricted" states); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 15 § 5.3 (2006); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-1-220 (2006) (requiring a minimum standard of not less than
20/40 corrected vision in at least one eye); HAw. CODE R. § 19-122-8 (Weil
2007), available at http://state.hi.us/dot/publicaffairs/drivered/subchapterl.

pdf.
50.

See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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David T. Levy found that more-frequent licensing also cut
down on the number of older drivers. 1 Hawaii, which permits
no discretionary licensing, also begins a two-year renewal cycle
for drivers over seventy-two and requires personal appearances
for all those over sixty-five.52 Only two accidents were reported
53
for 2003, neither of which involved drivers over sixty-five.
Because of concerns about discrimination suits, New York
adheres to its five-year renewal cycle, even for older drivers,54 but
its accident rate for the over-age-sixty-four drivers (0.06%) is
above the average of 0.04%, which is four persons over age sixtyfour in accidents per every thousand licensed drivers over age
sixty-four. 5 South Carolina reduces its normal ten-year cycle to
five years for those over sixty-five, 5 6 and it has a low accident rate
of 0.03 accidents per thousand older drivers.5 7 These last two
states react imperfectly to the over age sixty-four driving situation
since they allow neither for flexible driver's licensing nor for
problems occurring during the lengthy period between licensing
episodes. For example, the Safe Mobility for Older People
Notebook recommends mandatory reporting by physicians if the
individuals will not do it themselves." For several years, New
York has proposed allowing physicians, police officers, or family
members to report unsafe drivers (again with immunity unless
the reporting is malicious), and these reports trigger review by
state authorities. 5" Were such a bill to pass, it would be similar to
the rule in effect in North Dakota, which is discussed below in
the section on flexible licensing.6 °
51. Levy, supra note 37, at 466.
52. HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-106 (2007) (requiring that people over the age
of seventy-two must renew their licenses every two years).
53. See infra Thl. 2 (showing no accidents involving drivers over the age of
sixty-four in the year 2000).
54. See Highway Loss Data, supra note 39 (indicating that New York has a
five-year renewal cycle).
55. See infra Tbl. 2.
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-210 (2006).
57. See infra Thl. 2.
58. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 3 MODEL DRIVER SCREENING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM: GUIDELINES FOR MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS, http://www.nhtsa.dot.

gov/people/injury/olddrive/modeldriver/3_foreword.htm

(last visited Sept. 6,

2006) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., GUIDELINES FOR MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN-

ISTRATORS] (This report was sponsored by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, in cooperation with the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators, and was produced by TransAnalytics, LLC and the Scientex
Corporation.).
59. See N.Y. ASSEMBLY BILL No. 5206 (2005).
60. See infra note 75.
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Unregulated

On the other extreme, the state can allow all people to
drive, regardless of their characteristics and can revoke a license
only when the driver is involved in a fatal accident, for example. 61 Tennessee (where drivers are licensed forever once they
reach age sixty-five) 6 2 takes this approach. The state also suffers
from the sixth highest accident rate (0.094) of drivers over age
sixty-four (per the over age sixty-four driving population).63 Like
the first option, lack of regulation provides for low cost administration, but it places the burden on the families of unsafe drivers
to take away their keys, 64 and it seemingly allows many unsafe
drivers to remain on the road.
3.

Reporting

A third option, followed by Maine, Oregon, and Pennsylvania,65 involves relatively lax licensing standards coupled with
mandatory physician reporting of dementia or vision problems.6 6
Maine has a very low number of accidents per older driver
(0.0029%), while California's rate of 0.024% is still well below the
norm (though California is also an "individualized" state).67
Reporting places the burden on physicians (or on the individual
if they avoid doctors who might report them).68 These states
61. Such states are deemed "Unregulated" in Table 3.
62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-337(b) (2004); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS.
§§ 1340-1-13.06-.17 (2004) (specifying no expiration date on licenses for drivers over sixty-five).
63. See infra Tbl. 2.
64. See, e.g., Editorial, Extra Oversight on Older Drivers Sensible, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Jan. 26, 2005, at 12A.
The fundamental argument for some extra review by government is
that this is a terrifically difficult issue for families to deal with on their
own. When elderly relatives get to the point where they should not be
driving, it is awkward-indeed almost impossible in some cases-for
the family to take away the keys. By involving licensing authorities, the
matter becomes more technical and less emotional.
Id.
65. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1258 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 807.710 (West 2003); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1518 (West 2004).
66. These states are designated as "Reporting" in Table 3. See Vasiliki L.
Tripodis, Licensing PoliciesFor OlderDrivers:BalancingPublicSafety With Individual
Mobility, 38 B.C. L. REv. 1051, 1082-83 (1997) (substantially discussing
mandatory reporting).
67. See infra Tbl. 2.
68. The Crozier-Chester Medical Center and Pennsylvania Medical Society strongly objected to mandatory reporting, on both burden and vagueness
grounds, during regulatory hearings. 16 Pa. Bull. 1279 (Apr. 12, 1986) (covering adoption, by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing, of amendments related to physical and mental criteria for the
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incur the cost of retesting those referred, and they also have discretionary licensing, including individualized restrictions that
may be required by the Medical Advisory Board.69 Reporting
works only if doctors are skillful at identifying unsafe drivers, so
the state incurs a cost of creating a detailed checklist. In order to
make physician reporting successful, these states also need to
provide immunity for those who report, even if it turns out they
were mistaken.7" Mandatory reporting removes the burden of
licensing of drivers, including vision standards); 21 Pa. Bull. 1813 (Apr. 20,
1991) (readopting the aforementioned amendments). One Pennsylvania newspaper article commented:
In Pennsylvania, doctors are required to report to PennDot
patients whose physical or mental condition could make driving dangerous, and police, family members and friends also can alert the
state. Of the more than 20,000 reports from doctors last year, about
30 percent resulted in a recall of a driver's license, 30 percent led to
restrictions, and about 30 percent resulted in license suspensions for
failure to undergo further testing, said Joan Nissley, a PennDot
spokeswoman.
Susan FitzGerald, A Turn for the Better, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 22, 2003, at
El. Physicians complain that patients may resent them if they make such a
report, as noted in a 2003 Pennsylvania newspaper article:
"He doesn't like me for that reason," Miller, director of geriatrics
for St. Luke's Hospital in Fountain Hill, said of the patient, who has
Alzheimer's disease, vision problems and other ailments. "And he's
very vocal about that."
Although it's a decision Miller has had to make often during 13
years working with the elderly, it's never easy to tell someone to put
away the car keys. But without conscientious physicians, Pennsylvania
would have no good way to weed out the bulk of drivers with ailments
that can make them lethal on the road.
James E. Wilkerson & Kathleen A. Parrish, State Relies on Many Eyes to Curb Unfit
OlderDrivers, THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.),July 26, 2003, at Al. A Washington state newspaper made a similar point:
The Washington State Medical Association also worries about
making doctors report who shouldn't drive, as Edwards' bill would
have required. "If we turn into policemen, we're afraid people will not
come to us with legitimate health concerns," said association lobbyist
Susie Tracy.
Marsha King, States Grapplingwith Age Issue, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 16, 2004, at Bi.
69. The Medical Advisory Board is a worldwide group of healthcare professionals, whose knowledge and advice have had a great effect on the medical
industry, including influence on governmental agencies and healthcare legislation. See, e.g., Medical Advisory Board, http://www.medicaladvisoryboard.com/
Medv2/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
70. Health care systems in Ohio have recently supported increasing legal
immunity to encourage doctors to adhere to strict reporting.
Doctors should try to be strict with patients who shouldn't drive,
including turning some in to state motor vehicle bureaus if they refuse
to give up the keys, [Dr. Borzotta, medical director of trauma services
for TriHealth, an integrated health care system serving the greater
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making the no-driving decision from the elderly person's family.
It also has the benefit of catching problem drivers earlier, rather
than waiting for license renewals. This type of procedure is
lauded by the
new guidelines of the American Academy of Family
71
Physicians.
4.

Individualized

Fourth, states may rely on flexibility in licensing.7 2 In some
states, this requires the doctor, perhaps with guidelines, to specify restrictions. In others, the restrictions are placed by the Medical Advisory Board or a similar group. Again, the persons
specifying restrictions must have immunity. Many of the costs lie
in drafting regulations and keeping track of restricted drivers,
though new technology may make this easier.
Unlike the
reporting option, individualized licensing does not catch drivers
between renewals. For several years, New York has proposed
allowing physicians, police officers, or family members to report
unsafe drivers (again, with immunity unless the reporting is malicious).74 Were this bill to pass, it would be similar to the rule in
effect in North Dakota. 75 North Dakota had no accidents per
Cincinnati area] said. But if Ohio or Kentucky ever makes such
reporting mandatory, doctors need more legal immunity than exists
today, Borzotta said.
Colerain Township resident Carolyn Whitaker says, "I do think
people with severe medical impairment should not drive, but the
responsibility for driver's licenses should not be part of a doctor's
requirements. In the case of elderly or Alzheimer's patients, it is the
family's responsibility to keep that person out of the driver's seat."
See Tim Bonfield, Drivers, Medical Risks Debated, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec.

5, 2004, at C1.
71. Richard A. Marottoli, Editorial, The Physician'sRole in the Assessment of
Older Drivers, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, Jan. 1, 2000, at 39.
72. States that take this approach are designated as "Individualized" in
Tables 3 & 5.
73. Technology may make it possible to test older drivers' skills without
putting them in a real traffic situation. See, e.g.,
Joan McQueeney Mitric, End of
the Road for Older Drivers,ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 15, 1995, at 6D (reporting on the National Traffic Simulator at the University of Iowa). The same
piece discusses the experiences of physicians who must tell people they should
no longer drive:
"A grade-school bus driver threatened me with a lawsuit when I
told him he was a serious threat to his passengers and the general
public," Rizzo [a neurologist] recalled. "Another man was so
demented he forgot he was driving and took his hands off the wheel to
talk with his wife."
Id.
74. See supra note 59.
75. The text of the North Dakota statute is as follows:

2007]

THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF DRIVING COMPETENCE REGULATIONS

419

one thousand drivers over age sixty-four as reported for 2003.76
Kentucky had 0.017177 accidents per one thousand drivers over
age sixty-four. 77 Pennsylvania had an over-age-sixty-four accident
rate of 0.038397, Oklahoma 0.057785, Oregon 0.00547, Nebraska
0.073517, Minnesota 0.002597, Nevada 0.003065, South Dakota
0.006877, and West Virginia 0.003637. Of these nine states, two
(Oklahoma and Nebraska) had a higher over accident rate than
the national average.7 8
5.

Frequent-Road/Vision/In Person

Another popular option is administratively expensive v° and
is characterized by frequent driving tests or other face-to-face
In addition to other powers set forth in this chapter, the director, having good cause to believe that a licensed operator is incompetent or
otherwise not qualified to be licensed, may upon written notice of at
least five days to the licensee require the licensee to submit to such
physical, mental, or driver's examination as may be deemed necessary.
If the director has good cause to believe that the licensed operator
presents an immediate danger to the motoring public, the director
may immediately, and without prior notice, suspend the operator's
license pending the examination. The notice of suspension must provide the operator with the opportunity for a hearing within five days of
the receipt of the notice of suspension. When a hearing is requested it
must be conducted under section 39-06-33 and the decision must be
rendered within two days of the conclusion of the hearing. Upon the
conclusion of such examination the director shall take action as may
be appropriate and may suspend or revoke the license of such person
or permit the licensee to retain the license, or may issue a license subject to restrictions as permitted under section 39-06-17. Refusal or
neglect of the licensee to submit to such examination shall be grounds
for suspension or revocation of the license.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-34 (1997).
76. See infra Tbl. 2.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Nancy Walser, When to Hang Up the Keys, HAiv. HEALTH LETrER, Nov.
1, 1991, at 1, 4:
Since Pennsylvania passed a law requiring physicians to report
potentially impaired patients, state examiners there have been
swamped with renewals brought to their attention via this route. They
have had to cut back on random testing due to limited staff and financial resources. In view of the tremendous increase in the elderly population, it remains to be seen whether states will be able to start or
expand such labor-intensive approaches to protecting public safety. If
such programs do catch on, they must include transportation assistance for those forced to hang up their keys. Otherwise, many older
people will be made to choose between being stranded and breaking
the law.
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appearances for older persons."' People over sixty-four might
complain that they have been discriminated against in such
states,8 1 and frequent appearances and testing are burdensome
and costly for those who are indigent or who live in rural areas.
The three states that use road tests to reissue seniors' licenses
include the District of Columbia, where road tests begin at seventy-five along with a physician's certification of driving ability,
vision, and sometimes competency tests; 2 Illinois, where road
tests are required every four years beginning at age seventy-five,
every two years between ages eighty-one and eighty-six, and every
year thereafter; 3 and New Hampshire, where tests are required
every five years beginning at seventy-five." 4 The rates of older
drivers in accidents for these three jurisdictions were 0% (out of
180 drivers in accidents), 0.05%, and 0.003%, respectively, with
only Illinois slightly greater than the national average.8 5
More states require vision testing at renewal, including Florida (age eighty or older, every four to six years) 86 Maine (every
80. These states are designated as "Frequent-road," "Frequent-vision," or
"Frequent-in person" in Table 3.
81. As one Pennsylvania newspaper article notes:
Not with the ardent opposition of nearly every group representing the elderly. The increasingly vocal and powerful organizations
believe any tests based on a driver's age to be discriminatory and
unfair.
Only a handful of states have these kinds of tests, and they all
were enacted before 1978. That was when the American Association
of Retired Persons (AARP), the country's second-largest organization
after the Catholic Church, started working against efforts to more frequently test the vision, reflexes and road abilities of older drivers.
Given the AARP's record across the nation, chances are good that
it could stop Pennsylvania's efforts to focus further attention on older
drivers.
Since the laws regarding age discrimination in the federal Older
Americans Act were strengthened in 1978, there has not been a single
law passed in any state that restricts the driving of older people, said
the AARP's Seaton.
Daniel Rubin & Marc Kaufman, Debate Gets Rolling on Testing of Older Drivers,THE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,

Apr. 30, 1991, at 1-A.

82. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 18, § 111.5 (2007), available at http://dmv.dc.
gov/info/title-18/chap0lpdf.shtm.
83. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-109(c), -115(g) (West 2005).
84. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 263:10 (LexisNexis 2006).
But see
www.dmv.org/nh-new-hampshire/renew-license.php ("Every four years you are
required to renew your driver's license.").
85. See infra Tl. 2.
86. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.18(2)(b), (5)(a) (West 2005).
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four years after age sixty-five), 7 Maryland (every four years
beginning at age forty),88 Oregon (every eight years after age
fifty),89 South Carolina (every five years beginning at age sixtyfive), 9° Utah (every five years beginning at age sixty-five), 9" and

Virginia (since 2004, every five years beginning at age eighty).92
The four smaller states all have lower than the average accident
rate for elders, while Florida (0.057227%), Maryland
(0.058453%), and Virginia (0.089144%) still rank in the bottom
third.9 3
Another group of states requires licensing in-person. Furthermore, states with rules prohibiting discrimination based
upon age, according to the Insurance Institute website, include
Maryland, whose law specifies both that age alone is not grounds
for reexamination of drivers and that applicants for an initial
license at age seventy and older must provide either proof of previous satisfactory operation of a vehicle or a physician's certificate of fitness.9 4
Massachusetts law, which prohibits
discrimination by reason of age with regard to licensing,9" ranks
96
in the highest half of accidents per drivers over age sixty-five.
Minnesota and Nevada laws specify that age alone is not ajustification for reexamination, but in Nevada, applicants seeking mail
87. ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 1303(1), 1406(2) (1996). Maine also
requires a competency test, discussed in the following newspaper article:
Such a screening test could identify people with Alzheimer's disease or a head injury that can alter their behavior, judgment and
attention span. It could also help licensing officials determine
whether a person is a driving risk, he said. California is the only state
that uses a cognitive test for license renewal.
To Hilton Power, the test on cognitive ability would be a way to
determine "if you can't think straight enough to drive." Power, 72, is a
member of the American Association of Retired Persons who has said
additional license tests for the elderly are discriminatory.
"The question of age discrimination is muted by using this age 40
(level for testing), but my feeling is a lot of people will still say it is
discriminatory.... Why don't they make everyone take the tests?" he
said.
Alan Clendenning, Older Drivers Under New Scrutiny: Among Proposals in a Task
Force's Draft Report Is Additional Testing for People Over 40, PORTLAND PREss HER-

ALD, Sept. 2, 1994, at IA.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

MD. CODE ANN., [Transp.] § 16-115(h) (LexisNexis 2006).
OR. ADMIN. R. 735-062-0060 (2006).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-220 (2006).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-214(3)(b)(ii) (2002).
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-330(C) (2005).

93.
94.
95.
96.

See infra Tbl. 2.
See Highway Loss Data, supra note 39.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 8 (LexisNexis 2005).
See infra Tbl. 2.
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renewal at age seventy and older must include a medical
report.9 7 Both these states are in the lowest fifth of accidents per
drivers over age sixty-four, 98 and both provide for flexible and
restricted licensing of people unable to meet the usual vision
standards. This indicates that they would fall under the fourth
grouping of an individualized approach.
6.

Private

A more private solution, and one supported by the AARP, is
to require insurance companies to give discounts for seniors taking driving refresher courses.9 9 Sixteen states follow this procedure, though only six of these seem to use it as their primary
97.
98.
99.

See Highway Loss Data, supra note 39.
See infra Tbl. 2.
This sponsorship is not new.
But AARP's answer [to the growing problem of aging drivers], he
[Michael Seaton, assistant manager of AARP's "55-Alive-Mature Driving" program] said, has been to work to improve the driving of older
people, rather than to restrict it.
The organization began its 55-Alive driver refresher program in
1978, and since then almost two million drivers 55 and older have
taken the course.
As a way to encourage older drivers to sign up, AARP has offered
10 percent discounts on the auto insurance policies that it sponsors,
and over the last decade it has persuaded 31 state legislatures to force
all auto insurers in their states to grant a discount of at least 5 percent
to older drivers who have passed the course.
Rubin & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 7-A. However, the AARP recently sponsored a more frequent driver's examination bill in Florida:
A proposal that will require seniors to have a vision test when
renewing their driver's licenses will start making its way through the
Legislature next week, and one of its surprise supporters is AARP, the
massive seniors' lobbying group that for years ferociously fought any
driver testing based on age.
"We've never been against taking people who can't drive off the
road, we only opposed doing it at a certain age," said Bentley Lipscomb, AARP's state director. "We're doing this because other older
people are getting killed by the ones who can't drive."
Diane C. Lade, Testingfor SeniorDrivers Advances, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL,
Mar. 7, 2003, at IA. The AARP has also commented on practical difficulties of
requiring frequent testing of senior drivers. "The AARP believes all drivers
should be tested regularly and fully, but Mason [AARP National Coordinator
for Consumer Issues] says most cash-strapped states can't afford it and single
out the older driver." Vicki Smith, States Wrestle with Questions About Older Drivers, CENTRE DAILY TIMES (State College, PA), Aug. 1, 2004, at C1. "Unfortunately, [Mason] said, lawmakers often react to high-profile crashes without
studying the science and seeking input from seniors." Id. This suggestion echoes this paper's available heuristic literature.
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strategy.1 00 All these states rank near the highest in accident
rates, including four of the highest five (Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, and Michigan).1 °
7.

Self-Reporting

Although no states currently use it, another option would be
to regulate through self-reporting, as with moving violations for
commercially licensed drivers.1 0 2 The problem to anticipate
would be a lack of compliance with the federal regulations and
enforcement by state authorities. This lack problem might be
similar to the mandatory physician's reporting problems
reported in the regulation comments in Pennsylvania."0 3 The
commercial driver's license issue is thought to revolve around
perceived loss of employment rather than other life issues that
are typical for older persons.
Should states have a vision standard for drivingas opposed to
one for licensure? If there were a vision standard for driving,
and each state made its citizens aware that they were responsible
for knowing if they met that vision standard, there would be little
need for mandatory reporting. The eye doctor would note in the
patient's chart whether the individual met the vision standard for
driving (documenting the fact) and then inform the patient.
The individual wanting to drive would then be responsible for
reporting to the state's motor vehicle department for further
assessment if he or she was below the standard. If the individual
did not make such a report (for example, if he or she was not
competent), the physician would be required to do so. Vermont,
like other states, asks drivers seeking renewal the following question: "Have you any physical or mental condition, other than
properly corrected eyesight, that could affect your ability to safely
100. Such states are designated as "Private" in Tables 3, 4, and 6. States
using this approach include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio, and
Tennessee. ALA. CODE § 27-13-120 (LexisNexis 1986 & Supp. 2005); Amz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-262 (2002); ARK- CODE ANN. § 27-19-608 (2004); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-4-632 (West 2006); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.43 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1107 (2000).
101. See infra Tbl. 2. In fact, one Alabama paper referred to a study showing that refresher courses do not reduce accidents. See Ginny MacDonald, UAB
Study: Older Driver Courses Don't Cut Wrecks, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 19, 2004, at
lB. The study referred to in MacDonald's article was conducted by Cynthia
Owsley and her colleagues. See, e.g., Cynthia Owsley et al., Impact of an Educational Programon the Safety of High-Risk, Visually Impaired, OlderDrivers, 26 Am. J.
PPEV. MED. 222 (2004).
102. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.27 (2005).
103. See sources cited supra note 68.
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operate a motor vehicle? If 'Yes,' provide (or send) details."1 ° 4 If
the details are not satisfactory to the Vermont motor vehicle
department, reporting drivers may be required to take a medical
evaluation form to their physician for completion. 5 Self-reporting similarly relies on individualized treatment of drivers rather
than blanket rules. Major problems with this approach include a
lack of driver honesty and cognitive impairment.
II.

WHICH SOLUTIONS WORK?

The answer to the question of which solutions work depends
upon the definition of "work". If the desired goal is to have the
maximum number of older drivers on the road while guaranteeing them the autonomy and self-esteem they wish, the regulatory
scheme that seems to work best is what I call the "private" or
"market-based solution." That is, essentially letting the price of
coverage (based upon one's personal accident rate) determine
whether or not a person drives allows the maximum number of
elderly drivers, holding other things constant. In order to make
this claim, I have placed as a dependent variable the number of
drivers over age sixty-four per percentage of persons in the population over age sixty-four.'0 6 Table 4 shows the result of a regression equation predicting this variable, using the presence or
absence of the "private solution,"'O° the high school graduation
rate in the state, the ratio of AARP lobbyists-per-State Legislator,10 8 and the Average Per Capita Income in 2003.109 The
104. Medical Advisory Board Practices, supra note 29, at 318
105. Id. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 636 (2006) ("Whenever the commissioner has good cause to believe that any . . . applicant for renewal of an
operator's license, is incompetent ... he may require such person to submit to
a special examination to determine his capabilities or mental or physical
fitness .... ").
106. The number of drivers by age in each state comes from U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, HIGHWAY STATIS-

2003 Table DL-22 (2003), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs03/
htm/d122.htm. Total population by age comes from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
TOTAL POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES 2000 (2002), http:/
/www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t08/tabOl .pdf.
107. As with the other legal variables in this study, this was determined by
collecting all applicable statutes, regulations, and driver's license manuals for
each state and coding them. The "private solution" was coded '1' (for yes) if
the state had an insurance-relief statute for people over fifty-five who took a
driving refresher course and did not have one of the other forms of regulation.
108. The number of AARP lobbyists-per-State Legislator was calculated by
obtaining the lobbyist disclosure form from each state. Nearly all of these were
obtainable on the internet, though Alabama's had to be obtained by phone.
This number was divided by the total number of legislators, obtained through
THE BOOK OF THE STATES tbl. 10.3 (The Council of State Gov'ts ed., 2003).
TICS
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resulting equation predicted more than 44% of the variance.
The "private solution" was statistically significant at less than 0.05,
as was the ratio of AARP lobbyists-per-legislator. Average Per
Capita Income, the only negative coefficient in the equation, was
significant at 0.10. The equation means that if the average state,
with 40% of the available population over age sixty-four being
licensed, were to adopt the "private solution," the ratio would
increase by 0.175 (of 0.40), or to 47%.
Tables 5 and 6 consider a different meaning of "working"
legislation. They consider the effect of two common statutory
schemes on the elderly driving rate: the "private solution," discussed in Table 3 (described further in Tables 4 and 6), and the
"individualized solution," characterized by restrictions on licensing set for the individual driver and a flexible lower vision limit
(described further in Table 5). In each regression equation, the
dependent variable is the accidents per one thousand by drivers
over age sixty-four per the number of drivers over age sixty-four
(or the elderly accident rate). 1 1 ° As in Table 4, the high school
graduation rate is used as an additional independent variable. In
the simple regression of Table 5, nearly 14% of the variance in
elderly accident rate was explained by the choice of the "individualized solution" and the high school graduation rate. Both variables were statistically significant, but the regulatory choice was
negative-that is, the adoption of an "individualized solution"
reduced the number of accidents per one thousand elderly drivers by about 3% of the average rate of 0.04. Table 6 explains
more than 34% of the variance from the normal accident rate.
Again, both the regulatory scheme (the "private solution") and
the high school graduation rate were statistically significant, and
the most variance was explained by the "private solution." This
time, however, the accident rate increased over the average, by
0.076%. In sum, these two tables show that the choice of licensing regime has consequences, not only for the number of elderly
who can drive, but also for the likelihood that relatively unsafe
109. Average per capita income was obtained from the United States
Department of Labor, Department of Labor Statistics, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/histinc/state/state3.html;
http://www.census.gov/prod/
2006pubs/07statab/income.pdf
110. U.S. DEP'T TRANsp., TRAFFIc SAFETY FACTs 2000, supra note 25

(reporting number of accidents); U.S. DEP'T TRANsp., GUIDELINES FOR MOTOR
supra note 58 (reporting number of drivers over sixty-

VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS,

four per state). Note that this variable controls for the difference in the extent
of driving behavior by the elderly in various states-if the public transportation
is very good, very few elderly will be driving, and a single accident will take on
more significance than in the average state.
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older drivers are on the road. If "works" means increasing safety,
the "individualized solution" seems preferable.
III.

WHAT EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCES IN REGULATION?

A.

Private or Unrestrictive Solution

Here, the usual pressure group explanation of legislative
activity seems accurate. That is, a group organized around an
important central issue, such as aging, is able to overcome information and other transaction costs to persuade legislators to vote
for its proposals. A number of states, yielding to pressures from
the AARP to increase the number of older licensed drivers, allow
or sometimes require insurance premium reductions for persons
over age fifty-five or sixty who take a certified driver retraining
course.' 1' This reasoning is consistent with the report of Table 4
that the ratio of AARP lobbyists-per-state legislator significantly
12
affected the likelihood that older drivers would be licensed."
None of these states featured an event like the farmer's market tragedy in California, although, in Arkansas, debate in the
newspapers began in 1998 after a Texas driver with Alzheimer's
and his wife, recovering from brain surgery, went missing, apparently crossed into Arkansas, and ultimately were found dead in
their vehicle after it plunged into a ditch near Hot Springs.1 1
No legislative changes were made in that state.' 1 4
For the most part, the legislation in "unrestricted" states
passed under the radar. That is, no obvious publicity surfaced in
the popular press before its enactment. The very few articles
written stress seniors' problems of maintaining their indepen111. See, e.g, ALA. CODE. § 27-13-120 (1986 & Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 41-2515 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.28 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-2217 (2002).
112. A regression table is not included at this point because no coefficient was statistically significant. The same is true with mathematical prediction
of selection of the "individualized solution."
113. E.g., Rodney Bowers, Do Elderly Pose Risk On Roads?, Air. DEMOCRATGAZETrE, July 20, 1997, at Al. In that instance, the only fatalities were the
couple themselves.
114. Similarly, the California incident was referred to by a (seventy-yearold) legislator in Colorado who called for a task force to examine more stringent licensing regulations, though not based on age. The legislation was sent to
a committee and never reached the full legislature. SeeJohn J. Sanko, Elderly
Drivers Under Scrutiny: Lawmaker, 70, Forming Task Force to Examine Safeguards in
Licensing, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 24, 2003, at 6A.
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dence without public transportation" 5 or the benefits of the
refresher courses promoted by insurers.1 16
B.

Individualized or Mandatory Reporting Solutions

In contrast to more permissive systems, the effort to tighten
driver's license renewal standards was usually' 1 7 preceded by
intensive media focus.' 18 Typically, the campaign and ensuing
115. See, e.g., Doug Peters, Tough Time for Elderly: Giving Up the Wheel, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Mar. 15, 1998, at Al.
116. See, e.g., William Green, Course Helps Older Drivers To Bolster Skills
Crimped by FadingFaculties, ARK. GAZE=rE, Oct. 22, 1986, at lB ("Highfill, who
said her 82-year-old husband still drives, but not at night, said the course had
helped participants become 'more aware of what's going on around them' and
be 'better defensive drivers.'").
117. In Louisiana, reform was spurred by a multimillion dollar judgment
holding the Department of Public Safety responsible for issuing a renewal
license to a physically handicapped, but not elderly, driver, without requiring a
medical evaluation. White v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 644 So. 2d 684
(La. Ct. App. 1994). In 2003, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.) suggested
reform and mentioned the California tragedy. See Older Drivers Need Checking,
ADvoc. July 22, 2003, at 6B. In metropolitan Washington, "Dr. Gridlock"
reported a number of letters citing bad accidents and advocating reform. See
Ron Shaffer, Concerns About Motorists With Some Miles on Them, WASH. POST, June
26, 2000, at BI.
118. Although hardly "intense," various reports of accidents involving elderly drivers were reported in an article, urging legislation, by Dan Kouba. See
Dan Kouba, Under the Influence of Old Age, THE IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 20, 2004,
at 26. Regarding California, see Opinion, Too Old to Drive? UNION-TRIB. (San
Diego, Cal.), July 19, 2003, at B.8.7:
George Weller, 86, didn't set out in his '92 Buick to take the lives
of 10 Santa Monicans and injure dozens of others. Nobody does. But
the error he has said he made-pressing the accelerator instead of the
brake, for two long blocks through a pedestrian farmers market-is,
mile for mile, made most often by elderly drivers. When that error or
any other results in an accident, elderly drivers are more likely than
younger drivers to be injured seriously, whether or not they hurt
someone else. And, mile for mile, studies show a clear spike in serious
accidents among drivers over 70.
So the question that's always touchy, in families and politics,
arises: How long should the elderly be allowed to drive?
And the answer cannot be: until they have an accident that
injures, even kills.
See also Josh Grossberg & Eddie North-Hager, Even Elderly Are Split on Age-Mandated Tests, DAILy BREEZE (Torrence, Cal.), July 18, 2003, at Al; Joy Buchanan,
Eyeing Older Drivers,NEWSDAv (Long Island, N.Y.),July 19, 2003, at A3 (quoting a
Torrance Assemblyman about a recent accident involving an elderly driver, noting "this tragedy brings up the issue of more frequent examination of senior
drivers, a subject that the Legislature has looked at in the past"); Steve Vlasich,
Seniors Need Tougher DriverRequirements, DAiLY NEWS (Los Angeles, Cal.), Aug. 15,
1999, at VI ("The catalyst behind Hayden's [California] bill was a series of
tragic deaths involving senior drivers. In Santa Monica, a 15-year-old girl was
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legislation were spurred by a tragic event involving the death of
multiple people at the hands of an elderly driver. 1 9 This event,
which made the reality of elderly driver accidents salient to the
public, usually, but not always, took place in the state enacting
the legislation (sometimes over the protests of lobbyists for physician groups). 120

There may be a relationship between interest groups' small,
intense preference or loss and salience for standing (and class
action) requirements. In this way, it is like the case or controversy requirement. Does the AARP, which seems large and difkilled walking in a crosswalk by a 96-year-old man, while in Lodi, an 85-year-old
driver killed a police officer."); Katherine Dore Perkins, New Programs Steer
Unsafe Older Drivers Away from Road, DAILY NEWS (Los Angeles, Cal.), Aug. 13,
1995, at N16 ("Pressure on physicians to take that responsibility is coming from
the families of those killed in crashes caused by impaired drivers. In at least
three states, they are pressing for laws requiring that obligation."). The Perkins
article also examined an issue in Chesterfield, Mo.:
In Chesterfield, Sheldon Suroff founded Concerned Americans
for Responsible Driving Inc. after his son, Jason, was killed. The 21year-old college student swerved his car to avoid a pickup going the
wrong way down the highway. The driver was a 91-year-old man found
to be senile.
"We want a law requiring physicians to report high-risk drivers,"
said Suroff. "Spouses and children of high-risk drivers are at their
wits' end for a way to get their relatives off the road."
He also is pressing for physician liability protection from patients
they report. "Physicians are worried about being sued," he said.
Perkins, supra.
119. See Virgil Tipton, Couple Wants to Get Bad Drivers Off Road, ST. Louis
PosT-DISPATCH, June 16, 1994, at IA; Martha Shirk, When a Loved One Shouldn't
Drive, ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATCH, Nov. 6, 1994, at IA; The Suroffs Story, http://
www.drivingsafe.org/suroffs.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (describing an accident involving an elderly driver which killed twenty-one-year-old Jason Suroff).
In Illinois, it was ajogger killed by "a disoriented 84-year-old driver," plus some
other accidents involving pedestrians. E.g., Editorial, When It's Time to Park the
Car, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 20, 1998, at E14. Even in Wisconsin, which "hasn't had an
elderly driver crash into a crowded farmers market," an article suggesting
reform mentioned such crashes. Staff, Don't Wait for Crash to Change License
Tests, CENT.WIs. SUNDAY, Aug. 3, 2003, at 6A. In Indiana, there was a fatal crash
involving an elderly hit-and-run driver. See Marcella Fleming, Crashes Spur Look
at Licenses: Rethinking of Rules Is Suggested, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR,July 19, 2003,
at Al. Florida, which renews all driver's licenses every four years, regardless of
the driver's age, had an accident in late July of 2003 involving the deaths of
three people in a farmers market. See Editorial, supra; Staff, supra.
120. Janet Hendel Shores, Taking the Law into Their Own Hands, HIGH PERFORMANCE PEOPLE, Mar./Apr. 1999, at 36, available at http://www.drivingsafe.
org/99_hpp.htm (describing the struggle the Suroff family faced in trying to
enact restrictions on elderly or incapacitated drivers in their home state of Missouri after their son was killed by an elderly driver traveling in the wrong
direction).
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fuse, have such intense preferences? Is that why a market, rather
than a regulatory, solution is the rule where the interest groups
hold sway?
Evolutionary economics, at least as demonstrated by Thomas
Schelling, 12 ' suggests that, if various cooperative or coordinating1 22 solutions are possible, one that becomes salient to the participants at the time of decision is much more likely to be
chosen. This is true not only of legal sanctions 123 but also securities regulation 24 and environmental regulation.1 25 In the case
of driving regulation, interest groups like the AARP, elder legislators, and the AMA all preferred a private, or minimally regulated,
solution.' 26 However, once the danger of allowing impaired,
older people to remain on the road became salient to the voting
public-because of the publicity surrounding fatal accidents
caused by older and impaired drivers-legislatures and state
departments of motor vehicles sprang into action and developed
more formal regulation. 127 This publicity
is similar to the news28
paper article discussed by McAdams.
However, unlike the water quality regulation discussed by
Adler, 129 driver's license regulation has been quite successful on
the state level. 3 ° It also may be part of a more comprehensive
121. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-58 (1963).
122. Richard H. McAdams, A FocalPoint Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L.
REv. 1649, 1664 (2000).
123. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83
VA. L. REv. 349, 350, 355, 388 (1997) for the proposition that criminals, too,
respond to salient criminal activity, to enforcement of it, and to victim reaction.
124. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in
Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 215 (2004).
125. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a
History of EnvironmentalProtection, 14 FoRDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 89 (2002).
126. See sources cited supra note 100.
127. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv.
1051, 1087 (2000) ("When actors overestimate the relevance of salient or memorable incidents at the expense of base rates, they employ the 'availability heuristic.'"); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1518-22 (1998) (stating
that environmental regulation is often driven by the "pollutant of the month"
syndrome).
128. McAdams, supra note 122.
129. See Adler, supra note 125.
130. The regulation also seems more successful (less controversial in its
implementation) than the "Megan's Laws" enacted after intense publicity of a
few stranger-child-abuse cases, also an example of the "availability heuristic."
For a critique that the statutes result in discrimination against persons of color,
and particularly African Americans, see Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial
Dimension of Megan's Law, 89 IowA L. REv. 1535, 1549-58, 1585-87 (2004) (dis-
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scheme, such as physician licensing or the general license
renewal process, and therefore may not require greater state
expenditures or intrusion into families' or older persons' lives.
What form this more regulated behavior takes may depend upon
the community culture. 3 1
According to public choice scholars, legislators have at least
three sets of influence on their behavior. 1 32 First, they must confront their voting public. 33 Are they acting within their constituents' expressed preferences and their own campaign promises so
they will be likely to be elected again? Second, and not surprisingly, they act according to their own true preferences. This
influence may be as simple as voting according to party lines or
may be deeply influenced by family situation and personal ethics. 13 4 Third, they must pay at least some attention to special
interest groups whose support will be needed to fund election
in the future and to guarantee the perquisites of
campaigns
35
office.'

cussing statistical racial disparities). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -19
(West 2005) (New Jersey's version of "Megan's Law").
131. See Richard H. McAdams, Cultural Contingency and Economic Function:
Bridge-Buildingfrom the Law &Economics Side, 38 LAw & Soc'v REV. 221 (2004);
Avner Greif, CulturalBeliefs and the Organizationof Society: A Historicaland Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912
(1994).
132. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229-44 (1989);JERRY
L. MAsHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE
PUBLIC LAW 23-25 (1997); FRED S.

MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITI-

RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 170 (1997) ("The one
unambiguous solution for reducing rent extraction is reducing the size of the
state itself and its power to threaten, expropriate, and transfer."); see also MUELLER, supra, at 245 ("[T] he best and simplest way to avoid the rent-seeking problem is to avoid establishing the institutions that create rents, that is, the
regulations and regulatory agencies that lead to rent seeking."); Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in EnvironmentalLaw, 8J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59 (1992);
Revesz, supra note 4, at 535; Peter H. Schuck, Against (andfor) Madison:An Essay
in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL'v REv. 553, 565-66 (1997).
133. See, e.g.,JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia A. Farina, Cognitive Psychology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 568-69 (2002) (citing
sources).
134. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
24-25, 28-33 (1991) (citing evidence to this effect);Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 225-27 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution,84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1690-91 (1984). JeffreyJ. Rachlinski and Cynthia A. Farina argued recently that fallibility, rather than bad motivations, causes most regulatory mistakes. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note
133, at 553-54.
135. See FARBER & FiucKEY, supra note 134, at 21-33; Schuck, supra note
132; Sam Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27J.L. & ECON.
CIANS,

20071

THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF DRIWNG COMPETENCE REGULATIONS

431

The second level of public officials concerned with driver
licensing is found in the state departments of transportation.
These state level officials may enact regulations further specifying
qualifications for drivers or procedures for licensing renewal and
will almost certainly control the funding allocations at the state
level. 13 6 Public officials, though seldom elected, face constraints
as well.'
They may be concerned with their reputation among
the people they will encounter when they leave public service
(the revolving door syndrome).' 3 They may also attempt to
181, 192-206 (1984); Barry R. Weingast et al., The PoliticalEconomy of Benefits and
Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to DistributivePolitics, 89J. POL. ECON. 642 (1981).
The classical concern about this is found in THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison).
136. The one qualification would be line-item budgeting. There have
been marked differences in the speed with which elder abuse legislation has
become law in the various states. Colorado (1990) and Idaho (1991) enacted
their statutes recently, while others (Florida, South Carolina, and Virginia) had
theirs in place many years earlier (1974). See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-11-204
(West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.101 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 395301 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-5 (1985 & Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.2-1605 (2002).
137. Public choice theory explains statutes and regulations as the result
of competing interest groups influencing the rule-making process. See FARBER
& FRICKEY, supranote 134; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, TheJurisprudence
of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1987); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669, 1684-87 (1975) (providing a summary of the discussion of agency "capture" by special interests);
GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCl.
3 (1971) (discussing regulation of the fur trade), reprintedin GEORGE J. STIGLER,
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 114-41 (1975).
138. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Efficiency and Conspiracy: Conflicts of Interest,
Anti-Nepotism Rules, and Separation Strategies, 66 FoRDHAM. L. REv. 2099, 2101
(1998); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371-73 (1983); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The IndependentJudiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON.
875, 877 (1975); Macey, supra note 134, at 231-32; Stigler, supra note 137
(1971); Tollison, supra note 1. For a discussion of the importance of networks
and revolving doors in executive agencies, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performanceof Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DuKE L.J. 1255, 1330
(1997). Sometimes lawmakers will, of course, be doing so for good reasonstheir own preferences follow those of the groups. See, e.g.,
AbnerJ. Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). For examples
involving regulation of the legal profession, see Today's News: Update, 208
N.Y.L.J. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Today's News]; see also ScotJ. Paltrow, The RevolvingDoor,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at D1 (discussing private sector jobs landed
by several top government enforcement officials, including the story of former
SEC Chairman David Ruder, who is now a partner at the law firm of Baker &
McKenzie); see generally Richard W. Painter, Game Theory and ContractarianParadigms in the Uneasy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 149, 169-70 (1996); see Todd J. Zwyicki, EnvironmentalExternalities
and PoliticalExternalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and
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maximize their
budgets 139 or the power of their agency in the
140
state cabinet.

Not surprisingly, one of the first applications of economics
to driver's licensing of the elderly belongs to Richard Posner. In
Aging and Old Age, Posner notes, as I have here, the increasing
factors that make driving difficult for elderly people.1 4 1 Consistent with his general "pragmatic" philosophy,1 42 he suggests that
insurance markets and the elderly themselves will most efficiently
regulate elderly driving. If older people are not compensating
their loss of functions well enough with their caution and experience, their insurance rates will increase, or they will just be sensible and leave driving to others.' 43 Posner's position is very close
to that adopted by the AARP and the several states that use "private solutions." In effect, it is a default position and has the
advantages of low direct costs and maximum individual autonomy. Also, as Table 4 shows, the "private solution," as compared
to the average, will permit a significantly higher percentage of
the elderly to continue driving. Further, because insurance rates
can be adjusted yearly, and self-monitoring can cause a driver to
stop driving at any time, the "private solution"
allows for change
1 44
between renewal cycles in nearly all states.
The public choice mechanism in the "private solution" states
is the traditional one: the interest group that is best organized
and cares the most about the issue, here the AARP, approaches
legislators with a plan that will promote the interests of the
Reform, 73 TUL. L. REv. 845, 885-86 (1999) (discussing agenda control among
agency interest groups).
139. See PETER H. ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND
CHOICE (1981); THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (Andr6 Blais & Stephane Dion eds., 1991); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 197 (1971); Stigler, supra note
137; TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al.
eds., 1980); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of LegislativeDelegation, 68 CORNELL

L. REv. 1, 37-62 (1982); Edna Earle VassJohnson, Agency "Capture":The "Revolving Door" Between Regulated Industries and Their RegulatingAgencies, 18 U. RICH. L.

REv. 95 (1983); Peltzman, supra note 135.
140. Thus they may seek to increase the number of people working
under them, the number of cases served, the number of reports issued, and so
forth. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 133, at 568 (citing sources).
141.
142.

RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 123 (1995).
See, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 49-50,

333 (2003).
POSNER, supra note 141, at 124-25.
144. In Illinois, where licenses must be renewed yearly for drivers over
eighty-seven, the insurance adjustments would happen simultaneously. See
Highway Loss Data, supra note 39 (noting that in Illinois drivers over eightyseven must renew their licenses yearly).

143.
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group. The AARP is a wealthy and extraordinarily successful
group, so legislators listen to the plan. Particularly since it does
not require state funding, and no one typically objects,
mandatory reduction of insurance premiums for those over fiftyfive taking AARP-sponsored "refresher" driving courses was the
approach taken in five states.
A third approach or interest is protection of the elderly from
discrimination. One study has noted that at least three states
"have specifically prohibited license renewal testing based only
on age on the grounds that this would constitute age discrimination."14' 5 While a detailed discussion of this approach is beyond
the scope of this paper, in general each of these states has held
that the constitutional protection against discrimination trumps
the concerns of individual or public welfare. In these states,
while there can be no specific differences in the frequency with
which the elderly are licensed, there are sometimes high acuity
vision requirements, individualized reviews, or mandatory physician reporting requirements, all of which are imposed upon the
entire population.
In contrast, some states have focused on limiting the number of older persons involved in accidents, both for their own
sake and, especially, to promote the safety of third parties who
may be harmed by unsafe older drivers. In these states, media
attention on driving calamities has brought unsafe elderly drivers
145. The states are California, Massachusetts, and Maryland. Elaine B.
Sharp & Paul E. Johnson, Taking the Keys from Grandpa 22 REv. POL'Y RES. 187,
190 (2005). Concerns about age discrimination have been raised in other states
considering age-based license renewal laws. See Tom Groening, Senior Back in
Driver'sSeat:Judge OverturnsRoad Restrictions, BANGOR DuALY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2004,
at BI (discussing the constitutionality of a Maine state law that gives the Maine
Secretary of State unfettered discretion to place restrictions and conditions on
an individual's driver's license); Ricki Morell, CarolinasStruggle with Licensingfor
Aged, CHARLOF-rE OBSERVER, June 24, 1996, at IA (noting concerns that "requiring strict testing of all elderly people could be discriminatory").
A 1996 newspaper article notes that some states avoid potential age discrimination concerns by passing laws granting physicians immunity for reporting unsafe drivers. Id. The article states: "about 27 states have such a law.
About seven states, including Oregon and California, go a step further: They
mandate that doctors report patients with medical impairments." Id. The California rule arose after the department was found liable for issuing a license to
an elderly and disabled driver who caused a serious accident. See Trewin v.
State, 198 Cal. Rptr. 263, 264, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). In contrast, a physician
was not found personally liable for failing to report (as required by statute) a
visually impaired driver, who caused a fatal accident, to the Department of
Transportation in Pennsylvania. Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623
(Pa. 1999). For further discussion of reporter immunity laws, see supra notes
65-71 and accompanying text.
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to public consciousness and legislative attention. 46 The legislators in these states, which tend to enact individualized or
mandatory reporting schemes, sometimes refer to the particular
instances motivating them. An individualized approach seems
the preferred solution, especially when coupled with rules
allowing physicians to report unsafe drivers so as to catch them
between licensing renewal periods.

146.
GOR

Eric Russell & Doug Kesseli, Woman, 79, Arrested After Pursuit, BAN-

DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2005, at C2.

When a serious accident caused by an elderly driver makes the news,
the public response often tends to be, "Get the old folks off the road!"
But aside from raising questions of basic fairness, pushing old folks off
the road would only raise another problem: how to get the elderly
around. The need to move from one place to another does not end
or even substantially decline with advancing years.
A. James McKnight, Too Old to Drive, 17 IssuEs Scj. & TECH., Winter 2000-01, at
63. As the preceding quotation suggests, it may be that the public would want
the more extreme solution, but this would raise one problem while solving the
other. It is possible that the net result of the lobbying for restrictive solutions
(done by victims or others on their behalf) is counterweighed by the continued
lobbying by advocates for the elderly, such as the AARP, who would otherwise
seek the private solution. I thank the participants at Boston University Law
School faculty symposium for suggesting this compromise to me.
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TABLE 1
POPULATION

65 YEARS AND OVER BY AGE: 1990 AND 2000

(FOR

INFORMATION ON CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION,
NONSAMPLING ERROR, AND DEFINITIONS, SEE HTTP://
WWW.CENSUS.GOV/PROD/CEN2OO/DOC/SFI .PDF)

State
Alabama
Alaska

1990 Population
65 years and over

2000 Population
65 years and over

Percent

Percent

12.9

13.0

Change, 1990 to
2000
Number

Percent

56,809

10.9

4.1

5.7

13,330

59.6

Arizona

13.1

13.0

189,065

39.5

Arkansas

14.9

14.0

23,961

6.8

California

10.5

10.6

460,106

14.7

Colorado

10.0

9.7

86,630

26.3

Connecticut

13.6

13.8

24,276

5.4

Delaware

12.1

13.0

20,991

26.0

Dist. of Columbia

12.8

12.2

-7,949

-10.2

Florida

18.3

17.6

438,166

18.5

Georgia

10.1

9.6

131,005

20.0

Hawaii

11.3

13.3

35,596

28.5

Idaho

12.0

11.3

24,651

20.3

Illinois

12.6

12.1

63,480

4.4

Indiana

12.6

12.4

56,635

8.1

Iowa

15.3

14.9

10,107

2.4

Kansas

13.8

13.3

13,658

4.0

Kentucky

12.7

12.5

37,948

8.1

Louisiana

11.1

11.6

47,938

10.2

Maine

13.3

14.4

20,029

12.3

Maryland

10.8

11.3

81,825

15.8

Massachusetts

13.6

13.5

40,878

5.0

Michigan

11.9

12.3

110,557

10.0

Minnesota

12.5

12.1

47,332

8.7

Mississippi

12.5

12.1

22,239

6.9

Missouri

14.0

13.5

37,698

5.3

Montana

13.3

13.4

14,452

13.6

Nebraska

14.1

13.6

9,127

4.1

Nevada

10.6

11.0

91,298

71.5

New Hampshire

11.3

12.0

22,941

18.3

NewJersey

13.4

13.2

81,111

7.9

New Mexico

10.8

11.7

49,163

30.1

New York

13.1

12.9

84,630

3.6
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North Carolina

12.1

12.0

164,707

20.5

North Dakota

14.3

14.7

3,423

3.8

Ohio

13.0

13.3

100,796

7.2

Oklahoma

13.5

13.2

31,737

7.5

Oregon

13.8

12.8

46,853

12.0

Pennsylvania

15.4

15.6

90,059

4.9

Rhode Island

15.0

14.5

1,855

1.2

South Carolina

11.4

12.1

88,398

22.3

South Dakota

14.7

14.3

5,800

5.7

Tennessee

12.7

12.4

84,493

13.7

Texas

10.1

9.9

355,956

20.7

Utah

8.7

8.5

40,264

26.9

Vermont

11.8

12.7

11,347

17.2

Virginia

10.7

11.2

127,863

19.2

Washington

11.8

11.2

86,860

15.1

West Virginia

15.0

15.3

7,998

3.0

Wisconsin

13.3

13.1

51,332

7.9

Wyoming

10.4

11.7

10,498

22.2

TABLE

2

FREQUENCY OF OVER-64 DRMWNG AND ACCIDENTS

State Abbreviation

Over 64 Drivers
/All Drivers

Over 64 Drivers
/Over 64 Population

Over 64 in
Accidents/Over 64
Licensed Drivers

AK

0.07524

0.504

0.02223

AL

0.16247

0.489

0.177391

AR

0.1737

0.425815

0.001884

AZ

0.15161

0.391

0.187577

CA

0.1192

0.35621

0.02475

CO

0.11441

0.446

0.115834

CT

0.18457

0.500458

0.002975

DC

0.10059

0.235

0

DE

0.15919

0.411

0.021534

FL

0.19562

0.431

0.057227

GA

0.11466

0.385

0.002318

HI

0.14207

0.352

0

IA

0.17027

0.353

0.075792

ID

0.15393

0.435

0.009464

IL

0.14023

0.342

0.049377

IN

0.128

0.339

0.048953

KS

0.15709

0.381

0.005902
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KY

0.14987

0.392

0.017177

LA

0.14756

0.354

0.002731

MA

0.14831

0.383

0.037677

MD

0.13943

0.371

0.058453

ME

0.15616

0.382

0.002853

MI

0.14416

0.386

0.142867

MN

0.16379

0.388794

0.002597

MO

0.15569

0.367

0.055152

MS

0.15009

0.367

0.022192

MT

0.15703

0.42

0.003934

NC

0.13192

0.385

0.074735

ND

0.17234

0.388

0

NE

0.15883

0.398

0.073516

NH

0.13495

0.409

0.003304

NJ

0.16275

0.399402

0.053533

NM

0.14796

0.401

0.11645

NV

0.13881

0.447

0.003065

NY

0.15194

0.345

0.062204

OH

0.16028

0.381

0.05175

OK

0.17708

0.356778

0.057785

OR

0.1498

0.417

0.00547

PA

0.1752

0.36

0.038397

RI

0.16552

0.325

0.004042

SC

0.14941

0.402

0.003075

SD

0.17352

0.403

0.006877

TN

0.15442

0.426

0.094055

TX

0.12565

0.361

0.070395

UT

0.1156

0.418774

0.00047

VA

0.12876

0.375

0.089144

VT

0.15478

0.495484

0

WA

0.13076

0.401

0.050111

WI

0.14961

0.368

0.054517

WV

0.18014

0.397194

0.003637

WY

0.15653

0.486

0.010695

Average

0.148781

0.400286

0.040707
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Source: Data from Department of U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration, for 2000, Highway Statistics 2000, Table DL-22; United States Census.

438

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
TABLE

3

PREVALENT TYPE OF REGULATION
State Abbreviation

Type of Regulation

AK

Reporting

AL

Private

AR

Unregulated

AZ

Private

CA

Individualized

CO

Private

CT

Individualized

DC

Frequent-road

DE

Restricted

FL

Frequent-road

GA

Individualized

HI

Restricted

IA

Frequent-road

ID

Frequent-road

IL

Frequent-road

IN

Frequent

KS

Individualized

KY

Individualized

LA

Frequent

MA

Individualized

MD

Restricted

ME

Reporting

MI

Private

MN

Individualized

MO

Frequent

MS

Individualized

MT

Frequent-in person

NC

Unregulated

ND

Individualized

NE

Individualized

NH

Frequent-road

NJ

Reporting

NM

Frequent-vision

NV

Restricted

NY

Restricted

OH

Private

OK

Individualized

OR

Individualized
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PA

Individualized

RI

Individualized

SC

Restricted

SD

Individualized

TN

Unregulated

TX

Individualized

UT

Frequent-vision

VA

Frequent-vision

VT

Individualized

WA

Frequent-in person

WI

Individualized

WV

Individualized

WY

Frequent-vision
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Source: Data on accidents comes from the National Highway Traffic Safety Commission,
ftp://ftp.nhtsa.dot.gov/ges/ (2003 data). There were 100,216 drivers for whom zip code
of residence was available.
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF OLDER PERSONS LICENSED
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
B

Coefficients

Std. Error

t

Sig.

Beta

(Constant)

.882

.303

2.911

.006

Private Solution

.175

.082

.231

2.128

.039

HS Graduation Rate

.005

.004

.151

1.319

.194

Ratio of AARP
Lobbyists/State
Legislator

.006

.002

.498

4.085

.000

Average Per Capita
Income 2003

-1.138E-05

.000

-.225

-1.802

.078

2

Notes: (R (adjusted)

.442)

Dependent Variable: ratio of drivers 64 and older/percent 64 or older in population
TABLE 5
DETERMINANTS OF ACCIDENTS/OLDER DRIVER
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
B
(Constant)
HS Graduation Rate
Individualized Solution

Std. Error

Coefficients

t

Sig.

-1.384

.173

Beta

-.092

.066

.002

.001

.290

2.188

.034

-.028

.013

-.290

-2.184

.034

Notes: (RF (adjusted) =.138)
Dependent Variable: Accidents*1000 for over 64 drivers/drivers over 64
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TABLE

DETERMINANTS OF ACCIDENTS/OLDER DRIVER (PRIVATE TYPE)
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
B
(Constant)

Coefficients

Std. Error

t

Sig.

Beta

-.076

.058

-1.304

.198

HS Graduation Rate

.001

.001

.219

1.872

.067

Private Solution

.076

.017

.535

4.565

.000

Notes: (R (adjusted) =.342)
Dependent Variable: Accidents*1000 for over 64 drivers/drivers over 64

FIGURE 1
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN SAFETY AND
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF THE ELDERLY
(THE STATES WHOSE NAMES ARE NOT SHOWN
ARE IN THE GROUP AT THE BOTTOM)
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